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In a statement issued through its lawyers, Kimberly says that the HSE’s alert actually says no more than Terex Genie’s own alert of 29 July 2013.
Rick Jaeger-Fozard, foreman at Kimberly’s Iver depot, was killed on 5 June last year when the Genie Z135/70 he was operating toppled over, landing over the depot’s perimeter fence and onto the hard shoulder of the M25 motorway.
Kimberley says that it is not yet clear who was at fault in the miscalibration – or possibly lack of calibration – of the fatal machine resulting in the safety mechanisms failing to stop it moving when it reached its safe working limit.
However, it asserts that manufacturers can easily eliminate this risk of human error by adding another electro-mechanical safeguard, and it has advised both Genie and the HSE of this.
Kimberley’s statement appears to indicate its frustration that the HSE has made no statement on this point.
We publish Kimberly's statement in full here:
This statement is issued by Kimberly Access in response to the Health &Safety Executive’s Safety Alert, Bulletin number FOD 1 - 2014, issued on 4 February 2014.
The Safety Alert issued by the Health and Safety Executive indicates that "emerging findings from the HSE investigations indicate that the operational stability of the Genie Z135/70 MEWP may be compromised by the incorrect measurement of the boom angle sensors".
The HSE’s investigation has not produced any safety guidance for users of Genie Z135/70 machines which is additional to that published by Genie on 29 July 2013 in its Safety Notice number 130005 (Genie’s Safety Notice principally emphasised the importance of ensuring that the secondary boom angle sensors were calibrated correctly).
Kimberly assumes the HSE considers that the most significant factor which contributed to causing the fatal accident to occur on 5 June 2013 was incorrect calibration of the machine’s secondary boom angle sensors. It is yet to be established who calibrated the sensors incorrectly, and under what circumstances.
Calibrating the secondary boom angle sensors incorrectly is a human error, which Kimberly’s independent engineering expert considers can compromise the machine’s overturning stability. In short, calibrating the secondary boom angle sensors incorrectly can allow the secondary boom to start to extend before it has elevated fully, which can take the machine outside its ‘stability envelope’.
The HSE’s Safety Alert stops short of stating what is required to prevent a similar accident occurring again. Advising that the boom angle sensors should be calibrated correctly as per Genie’s Safety Notice and recommending that the calibration of the angle sensors is checked using an inclinometer before the platform is elevated does not eliminate the risk of the sensors being calibrated incorrectly in the future as a result of human error.
Kimberly has been advised by its expert that the risk of the machines’ overturning stability being compromised as a result of human error can be eliminated by modification of the machines, involving the installation of an additional electro-mechanical safeguard.
Kimberly has shared this expert advice with the HSE and with Genie during recent months. As matters stand neither the HSE nor Genie have indicated formally whether they agree or disagree that additional equipment safeguards are required.
It is the opinion of both Kimberly and its independent engineering expert that the installation of the proposed modification is vital in the prevention of further similar accidents involving Z135/70 machines. Whilst Kimberly’s concern is for the future safety of users of Z135/70 machines, it should be noted that the estimated cost of such a modification is minimal.
Kimberly grounded all of its Z135/70 machines immediately following the accident, and they will be kept grounded until the company’s concerns about fundamental safety issues have been addressed and the machines have been suitably modified.
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